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Our publications
Specialist research in technology, engineering and applied science.
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Computing & Security
Cybersecurity, digital trust and resilient systems.

Networks & Telecommunications
6G and beyond, AI-native and intent-based networks, network slicing, programmable and resilient communications infrastructure, edge connectivity, and security of next-generation networks.
Title review: preliminary screen complete; formal ISSN clearance pending

Energy Systems & Power
Battery management, energy storage systems, microgrids, distributed energy resources, grid resilience, flexibility, and power-system integration.
Title review: preliminary screen complete; formal ISSN clearance pending

Physics, Optics & Acoustics
Atomic and molecular physics, optics and photonics, instrumentation, acoustics and ultrasonics, wave propagation, imaging, and related experimental physics.
Title review: preliminary screen complete; formal ISSN clearance pending

Nursing Practice
Advanced and specialized nursing practice, medical-surgical, critical care and emergency nursing, assessment, diagnosis, care planning, evidence implementation, and patient safety.
Title review: preliminary screen complete; formal ISSN clearance pending

Mechanical Engineering
Mechanical engineering, mechanics of materials, automotive engineering, machine design, thermofluids, dynamics, and integrated mechanical systems.
Title review: preliminary screen complete; formal ISSN clearance pending

Civil & Built Environment
Civil and structural engineering, architecture, building and construction, geotechnical engineering, building performance, and resilient built environments.
Title review: preliminary screen complete; formal ISSN clearance pending

Trustworthy AI
Safety, robustness, explainability, fairness, privacy, accountability, evaluation, governance, and reliable deployment of AI and machine-learning systems.
Title review: preliminary screen complete; formal ISSN clearance pending
Background: EPSS publishes daily probabilities and percentiles to help defenders prioritize vulnerabilities. Major model replacements may disrupt operational queues, but this discontinuity has not been quantified across public EPSS versions.
Background: Open-source vulnerability records connect source-native identifiers through aliases. The Open Source Vulnerability (OSV) specification treats aliases as symmetric and transitive, but consumers that stop at one record's directly listed identifiers may recover an incomplete equivalence set.
Background: Open Source Vulnerability (OSV) records can describe affected versions with fixed, last_affected, limit, and enumerated-version representations. Only an explicit fixed event directly identifies a version that contains a fix.
Background: Package-security tools need severity metadata they can parse consistently. The Open Source Vulnerability (OSV) schema supports quantitative severity arrays at record and affected-package levels, while source databases can publish local qualitative labels. Their availability across package ecosystems has not been measured at scale.
Background: Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange (VEX) documents communicate whether a vulnerability affects a specific software product. OpenVEX, CycloneDX, and the Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) encode overlapping VEX concepts, but implementers lack controlled evidence about which semantics survive translation and which validators detect malformed or incomplete statements.
Background: CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog is the most authoritative public statement that a vulnerability has been exploited — and, since 2024, the anchor of NIST's triage policy, with enriched analysis now promised for KEV entries within one business day of listing. Yet the catalog measures agency decisions , not exploitation itself, and the interval between the events that matter — CVE publication, KEV listing, and confirmed exploitation — has never been decomposed for the post-2024 period. Objective: This paper specifies a measurement framework for KEV entry lag and coverage, synthesizes the published record, and identifies the gaps that the 2026 enrichment policy leaves open. Methods: Documentary analysis of the KEV catalog's requirements and operations (2021–2026), the NVD prioritization policy of April 2026, and published exploitation-timing measurements; construction of a pipeline-lag decomposition and a gap-versus-mitigation matrix. Results: KEV listing is a lagged, decision-based signal: it requires an exploitation determination by CISA, not merely evidence, and its coverage is bounded by the catalog's statutory scope — non-federal, non-KEV high-risk vulnerabilities fall outside both the catalog and the new enrichment priority. We identify six residual gaps, of which the deepest is structural: the 2026 policy enriches the exploited minority within one business day while formally deprioritizing everything else, converting the enrichment gap into a permanent, policy-defined class. Conclusions: KEV-derived metrics should be reported as decision-lag measurements with explicit coverage bounds, complemented by predictive signals (EPSS) and community enrichment (ADP) — never as a complete map of exploitation.
Background: On 12 February 2024, the U.S. National Vulnerability Database slowed its enrichment of new CVE records, creating a backlog that grew past 18,000 unanalyzed vulnerabilities — at its peak, 93.4% of new CVEs went unanalyzed, and even 46.7% of CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities added in that window waited months for analysis. Recovery reached pre-slowdown processing rates by March 2025, and NVD enriched approximately 42,000 CVEs in 2025 (+45% over any prior year), but CVE submissions grew 263% between 2020 and 2025, and in April 2026 NIST formally moved unenriched pre-March-2026 records to a "Not Scheduled" category, adopting prioritized enrichment (KEV-first within one business day). Objective: We audit the full 2024–2026 backlog record and analyze how the enrichment gap propagates through the downstream vulnerability ecosystem. Methods: Longitudinal documentary analysis of NIST/NVD operational announcements, third-party backlog measurements (VulnCheck), and the downstream data architecture (CVE List → NVD → ADP layer → consumer feeds); construction of a backlog-risk register. Results: The backlog's severity was concentrated in exactly the fields that downstream tools consume — CPE applicability, CWE classification, and NVD-CVSS scores — breaking asset matching, triage, and compliance scanning for the unenriched window. The community-layer response (CISA's ADP Vulnrichment from July 2024) demonstrated that parallel enrichment is feasible but arrived with coverage and quality variance. The 2026 prioritization policy converts a temporary gap into a permanent two-tier record. Conclusions: The enrichment gap is structural, not episodic: a triage-first enrichment policy plus 263% submission growth means the unenriched tier will persist and grow. Downstream consumers must diversify their enrichment inputs (ADP feeds, EPSS, exploit signals) and stop treating NVD CPE data as the sole asset-matching mechanism.
Background: A single software vulnerability typically exists in four public records simultaneously: the CVE entry (CNA-authored), its NVD enrichment (CPE/CWE/CVSS), the GitHub Security Advisory (ecosystem-scoped, reviewed), and its OSV aggregation. These sources disagree — on affected version ranges, severity, and fix status — and consumers of vulnerability intelligence rarely reconcile them. Objective: We consolidate the published consistency evidence, formalize the inconsistency classes that matter to consumers, and assess the reconciliation mechanisms available in current tooling. Methods: Synthesis of the large-scale consistency literature (the VIEM measurement of 78,296 CVE/report pairs; the GHSA review-pipeline characterization), architectural analysis of the four-source data flow, and a six-class inconsistency-versus-reconciliation assessment. Results: The published record establishes that divergence is prevalent (only 59.82% of CVE/report pairs strictly matched NVD entries at VIEM's 2019 measurement, with inconsistency increasing over time), and the 2024-2026 structural changes — NVD enrichment triage, ADP parallel enrichment, GHSA's multi-source review pipeline — have multiplied the divergence surface. We identify six inconsistency classes and find that the strongest reconciliation mechanisms (canonical-record policies, field-level cross-validation) are organizational choices rather than shipped tooling: today's pipelines aggregate first and reconcile never. Conclusions: Cross-source consistency must become a measured property of vulnerability intelligence pipelines — with a declared canonical record, field-level validation, and time-stamped audits — or consumers will continue to receive silently conflicting answers to the same question.
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